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Natural Selection, Levelling, and Eternal Recurrence
How	Nietzsche	Addressed	Darwinism	in
His Effort to Surpass the Body-Mind-Dichotomy
Abstract 
This paper addresses the ongoing debate on Nietzsche’s relationship to Darwinism, 
pursuing the specific meaning of Nietzsche’s integrative account of evolution in his writings. 
Exploring the evolutionary vocabulary in his discussion of the will to power and his criticism 
of Malthus’s concept of adaptation, the article claims that the so-called explicit Anti-Darwin 
position in Nietzsche’s late writings is part of his encompassing attempt to surpass the 
narrow margins of a strictly anatomical-biological or socio-Darwinist concept of evolution. 
That Nietzsche does so by using biological vocabulary shows his eagerness to map the 
impact of biological and cultural forces on humankind’s evolution. This article wants to put 
the contemporary debate on culture and evolution in a broader historical perspective. At the 
same time, it also wants to contribute to a better understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophical 
anthropology,  and in  particular,  of  his  changing ideas on weakness  and strength,  on the 
intellect and eternal recurrence as a principle of selection – ideas Nietzsche developed in 









Darwin or within Darwinism in a broader perspective.2	However,	doing	so,	
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John	Richardson,	“Nietzsche	contra	Darwin”,	
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65	 (2002)	 3,	 pp.	 537–575,	 here	 p.	 538,	 doi:	
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tb00221.x.
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Cf.	 Daniel	 R.	 Ahern,	 Nietzsche as Cultur-
al  Physician,	 Pennsylvania	 State	 Universi-
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Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 Cambridge	
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(ed.),	A Companion to Nietzsche,	Blackwell,	
Malden	 (MA)	 2006,	 pp.	 517–532;	 Dirk	 R.	
Johnson,	 “One	 Hundred	 Twenty-Two	 Years	
Later:	Reassessing	the	Nietzsche-Darwin	Re-
lationship”,	The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 
44	 (2013)	 2,	 pp.	 342–353,	 doi:	 https://doi.
org/10.5325/jnietstud.44.2.0342;	Christian	
Emden,	 Nietzsche’s Naturalism: Philosophy 
and the Life Sciences in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge	






sic evolutionary paradigm.3 He focuses on cultural development and aims to 
integrate biological and cultural forces in one encompassing account of evo-
lution,	even	though,	to	do	so,	he	uses	biological	vocabulary.
The	evolutionary	paradigm	does	not	always	centre,	as	Babich	claims,	upon	
“the	Urkünstler or Aeon”.4  It  systematically  entails  the  idea  that  transmis-
sion	across	generations,	 inheritance,	does	not	occur	on	two	separate	levels,	
as traditional philosophical conceptualisations of the human as a creature that 
consists	of	 a	biological	body	and	a	 cultural	mind	 require,	but	 through	one	
single	process	–	Einverleibung.5	In	this	article,	we	will	show	that	Nietzsche’s	
re-evaluation  of  the  Darwinian  theory  of  evolution  was  not  a  goal  per  se,	
but  a  stepping  stone  towards  establishing  his  understanding  of  evolution  
through the framework of the will to power. This will help to understand why 
Nietzsche characterised his philosophical investigations into evolution in his 
late	writings	as	“Anti-Darwin”	(TI	“Skirmishes”	14).	Skowron	has	convinc-
ingly	shown	that	Nietzsche’s	position	cannot	be	seen	as	a	rebuttal	of	Darwin,	
but	 rather	–	 in	 the	 style	of	 the	 ancient	agon –	as	 an	 affirmation	 of	 the	 fa-
mous biologist as an opponent.6 A close analysis of the Darwinian concepts in 
Nietzsche’s	writings	will	enable	us	to	determine	the	exact	meaning	of	this	so-
called Anti-Darwinism in his new philosophical understanding of the human. 
Hence,	we	will	see	that	Nietzsche	already	addresses	what	has	been	labelled	
one	of	the	major	problems	in	contemporary	biology7	and	was	described	as	“a	
deep evolutionary mystery on a par with the origins of life itself”8	–	the	ques-
tion of cultural evolution.
Natural Selection
To	 better	 understand	 Nietzsche’s	 evolutionary	 vocabulary,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	
answer	whether	 he	 endorses	 the	 principle	 of	 natural	 selection	 or	 not	 –	 an	
important issue in contemporary Nietzsche-research. Forber correctly claims 




tary.9 Johnson argues that Nietzsche supported the idea of struggle for exist-
ence in general terms already in the Untimely Meditation  on David Strauss 
(1873).10	In	our	view,	Nietzsche	articulated	an	explicit	adherence	to	all	three	
prerequisites of natural selection as early as in Menschliches, Allzumenschli-
ches I (1878),	be	it	with	critical	comments.













selection. The struggle for existence not only depends on those organisms that 
are	best	adapted,	but	a	variance	also	characterises	it	in	disposition	within	each	
organism.	This	variance	relies	on	the	organism’s	degree	of	pleasure,	which	
determines whether the organism obtains a favourable evolutionary position. 
Aphorism	104	thus	explains	what	seemed	to	be	a	remark	with	casual	evolu-
and	Nineteenth-Century	Biology”,	The Jour-
nal of Nietzsche Studies	 48	 (2017)	 1,	 pp.	
71–82,	 doi:	 https://doi.org/10.5325/jniet-
stud.48.1.0071.
3   
See	 in	 particular:	 Werner	 Stegmaier,	 “Dar-
win,	Darwinismus,	Nietzsche.	Zum	Problem	
der	Evolution”,	Nietzsche-Studien	16	(1987),	
pp.	 264–287,	 here	 p.	 269;	Dirk	R.	 Johnson,	
Nietzsche’s Anti-Darwinism,	Cambridge	Uni-
versity	 Press,	 Cambridge	 2010,	 p.	 14,	 135,	
who	 speaks	 of	 “creative	 antagonisms”.	 Cf.	
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B.	Babich,	“Nietzsche	and/or/versus	Darwin”,	
p.	410.
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Sven	 Gellens,	 Benjamin	 Biebuyck,	 “The	
Mechanism	 of	 Cultural	 Evolution	 in	
Nietzsche’s	 Genealogical	 Writings”,	 Philos-
ophy  Today	 56	 (2012)	 3,	 pp.	 309–326,	 doi:	
https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday201256313. 
Clark claims that Nietzsche is occupied with 
cultural	 inheritance	 by	 memes,	 and	 hence	
opposes	 Schacht’s	 argument	 that	 Nietzsche	
supported	 a	 Lamarckian	 approach	 to	 the	 in-
heritance  of  biological  characteristics.  Cf.  
Richard	 Schacht,	 “Nietzsche	 and	 Lamarck-
ism”,	 The Journal of Nietzsche Studies  44  
(2013)	 2,	 pp.	 264–281,	 here	 p.	 270,	 doi:	
https://doi.org/10.5325/jnietstud.44.2.0264;	
Maudemarie	 Clark,	 “Nietzsche	 Was	 No	
Lamarckian”,	The Journal of Nietzsche Stud-
ies	44	(2013)	2,	pp.	282–296,	here	p.	288,	doi:	
https://doi.org/10.5325/jnietstud.44.2.0282. 
Forber,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 suggests	 that	
Nietzsche’s	teleological	notion	of	will	to	pow-
er	makes	 him	 into	 a	Lamarckian	 in	 biologi-
cal	matters,	whereas	he	is	considered	to	be	a	
Darwinian	in	cultural	issues.	Cf.	Peter	Forber,	
“Biological	 Inheritance	 and	 Cultural	 Evolu-
tion	 in	Nietzsche’s	Genealogy”,	The Journal  
of Nietzsche Studies	 44	 (2013)	 2,	 pp.	 329–
341,	here	p.	338,	doi:	https://doi.org/10.5325/
jnietstud.44.2.0329.
6	   
Michael	 Skowron,	 “Nietzsches	 ‘Anti-Dar-
winismus’”,	 Nietzsche-Studien	 37	 (2008)	 1,	
pp.	160–195,	here	p.	175,	doi:	https://doi.org/
10.1515/9783110196900.1.160.
7   
Francisco	 J.	Ayala,	 “Human	 Evolution:	 The	
Three	Grand	Challenges	of	Human	Biology”,	
in:	David	Lee	Hull,	Michael	Ruse	(eds.),	The 
Cambridge  Companion  to  the  Philosophy  of  
Biology,	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 Cam-
bridge	2008,	pp.	233–255,	here	p.	234,	249.
8   
Peter	J.	Richerson,	Robert	Turner	Boyd,	Not 
by  Genes  Alone.  How  Culture  Transformed  
Human  Evolution,	 University	 of	 Chicago	
Press,	Chicago	2005,	p.	126.
9   
Peter	Forber,	“Nietzsche	was	No	Darwinian”,	
Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  Research 
LXXV	 (2007)	 2,	 pp.	 369–382,	 https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00080.x;	 P.	 J.	
Richerson,	R.	T.	Boyd,	Not by Genes Alone,	
p.	206.
10	   
“Nietzsche	 subscribed	 early	 on	 to	 Darwin’s	
central  notion  that  discrete  biological  wills  




p.	45;	 see	also	pp.	22–28);	cf.	 in	 this	matter	
also:	 B.	 Babich,	 “Nietzsche	 and/or/versus	
Darwin”,	p.	407.
11   
Translations of works by Nietzsche are taken 
from:	Friedrich	Nietzsche,	The Gay Science.  
With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Ap-
pendix  of  Songs,	 trans.	 Josephine	Nauckhoff	
–	Adrian	 Del	 Caro,	 Bernard	Williams	 (ed.),	
Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 Cambridge	
2001;	Friedrich	Nietzsche,	Beyond Good and 




Writings from the Late Notebooks, trans. Kate 
Sturge,	 Rüdiger	 Bittner	 (ed.),	 Cambridge	
University	Press,	Cambridge	2003;	Friedrich	
Nietzsche,	The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twi-
light of the Idols, and Other Writings, trans. 
Judith	Norman,	Aaron	Ridley	 –	 Judith	Nor-
man	 (eds.),	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	
Cambridge	 2005;	 Friedrich	 Nietzsche,	 Hu-
man, All Too Human. A Book for Free Spirits, 
trans.	Reginald	John	Hollingdale,	Cambridge	
University	Press,	Cambridge	2008;	Friedrich	







matter of self-preservation” (HH	I	102).12	Here	again,	Nietzsche	draws	back	
on Darwinian vocabulary but infuses it with meanings linked with pleasure 








existence (der berühmte Kampf um’s Dasein)	is	not	“the	only	theory	by	which	
the  progress  or  strengthening  of  a  man  or  a  race  can  be  explained”  (HH  I  
224).14	Across	the	fifth	 chapter	of	the	book,	he	mentions	the	two	remaining	
necessary	conditions	of	natural	selection:	variation	and	heritability.	Variation	
occurs	 in	 the	 differentiation	between	 the	 strong	 and	 the	weak,	 two	groups	
with a conspicuous internal variety. The process of habituation (Gewöhnung,	
HH	I	226)	produces	stronger people	and	compels	them	to	be	‘good’	members	
of	 the	community.	By	adopting	 the	virtues	and	customs	forced	upon	 them,	
the	stronger	are	more	apt	to	respond	to	immediate	challenges.	Their	(smaller)	
repertoire of possible responses enables them to choose conveniently.15 The 








things. Countless numbers of this kind perish on account of their weakness without producing 
any	very	visible	effect;	but	in	general,	and	especially	when	they	leave	posterity,	they	effect	a	
loosening	up	and	from	time	to	time	inflict	an	injury	on	the	stable	element	of	a	community.”
The argument in aphorism 224 is incontestably situated within a Darwinian 
framework and thus supports our hypothesis that Nietzsche acknowledges a 
force	 in	nature	 that	can	be	 labelled	as	natural	selection:	aphorisms	such	as	
this	make	it	difficult	 to	insist	that	Nietzsche	rejected	natural	selection	on	the	
whole,	and	not	only	occasionally,	as	Richardson	suggests.16
There has been much debate on natural selection in recent Nietzsche-research 




ceived. Nietzsche is highly critical of the exclusive impact of a struggle for 
existence on the individual because it renders the immediate environment a 
deterministic milieu. This could mean that there has to be a one-on-one rela-
tion	between	a	trait	and	the	state	of	the	environment,	making	the	organism	a	
passive	receptor	of	environmental	changes.	Nietzsche	rejects	this	simplistic	





a	 decisive	 intellectual	 step	 towards	 a	more	 integrated	 idea	 of	 humankind,	
characterised	by	a	recursive	interaction	between	the	environment,	the	intellect	
and	the	body:	the	will	to	power.
One	 reason	 why	 Nietzsche	 will	 identify	 himself	 as	 “Anti-Darwin”	 in	
Götzen-Dämmerung –	written	ten	years	after	the	first	volume	of	Menschlich-
es, Allzumenschliches was	published	–	is	that	he	sees	the	Malthusian	frame-






seen,	it	 is	central	to	Darwin’s	thesis	that	variation is omnipresent in nature 
and not merely an exception. By interpreting nature as consisting of abundant 
variation Nietzsche drives the Darwinian focus on variation to its  extreme.  
Denying Malthus does  not  imply the removal  of  the  principle  of  selection.  
Since	struggle	is	for	Nietzsche	the	unique	characteristic	of	the	world,18 selec-




trans.	 Carol	 Diethe, Keith  Ansell-Pearson  
(ed.),	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 Cam-
bridge	2008;	Friedrich	Nietzsche,	Daybreak. 
Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans. 
Reginald	 John	 Hollingdale,	 Maudemarie	
Clark	–	Brian	Leiter	 (eds.),	Cambridge	Uni-
versity	Press,	Cambridge	2009.
12   
We  should  note  that  in  none  of  his  writings  
Darwin	 identified	 self-preservation	 as	 na-
ture’s	primary	drive;	at	best,	one	can	deduce	
it from his works. That Nietzsche linked Dar-
win  consistently  with  self-preservation  illus-
trates that he did not take notice from Darwin 
by	means	of	primary	 sources	–	a	philologist	
should  have  known  better.  When  Nietzsche  
talks	 about	 self-preservation,	 this	 should	not	
only be considered as something that consists 
out	of	“cunning	and	dissimulation”,	but	also	




ning and dissimulation is the proper means of 
self-preservation.” (HH	I	104)
13   
Cf.	also	KSA9:6[366],	p.	291.
14   
By  translating  Gesichtspunct  as  theory,	 the	
English	 version	 launches	 the	 idea	 that	 the	
struggle  for  existence  is  a  closed  theoretical  
construct per se,	whereas	Nietzsche	calls	it	a	
“point	 of	 view”,	 as	we	will	 show,	within	 an	
encompassing theory of natural selection.
15   




from his path.” (HH	I	224)
16	   
J.	Richardson,	“Nietzsche	contra	Darwin”,	p.	
546.	For	an	in-depth	discussion	of	this	topic,	
see:	 R.	 Schacht,	 “Nietzsche	 and	 Lamarck-
ism”,	 pp.	 264–281;	 and,	more	 convincingly,	
M.	Clark,	 “Nietzsche	Was	No	Lamarckian”,	
pp.	 282–296.	 None	 of	 these	 authors	 takes,	
however,	 the	 concept	 of	 Einverleibung into 
consideration,	as	we	will	do.
17   
Cf. TI	 “Skirmishes”	14.	For	Nietzsche’s	 op-
position	 against	 “reactive	 theories”,	 see:	
Daniel	Conway,	“Life	and	self-overcoming”,	
in:	K.	Ansell-Pearson	(ed.),	A Companion to 
Nietzsche,	pp.	532–548.
18   
Cf. BGE	259;	see	also	G.	Moore,	Nietzsche, 
Biology and Metaphor,	pp.	37–38.
19   
Marco	 Brusotti,	 Die  Leidenschaft  der  Erk-
enntnis – Philosophie und ästhetische Lebens-




Since adaptation is	a	consequence	of	natural	selection,	 it	may	be	useful	 to	
draw back on a distinction commonly made in contemporary biology. In the 
early	1980s,	evolutionary	biologists,	such	as	Stephen	Gould,	questioned	the	
notion of adaptation and suggested replacing the term re-adaptation by exap-
tation.21 Exaptation describes the evolutionary process in which a trait serving 
one  particular  function  comes  to  serve  another  or  a  trait  that  had  no  func-
tion becomes a new one. Daniel C. Dennett noticed that Gould was not the 
first	to	discuss	the	reorganisation	of	an	organism	to	which	this	process	leads,	








as	it	does,	in	the	form	of	the	will	and	way	to	greater power and always emerging victorious at 
the cost of countless smaller forces.” (GM	II	12)
To	understand	this	statement	properly,	we	have	to	situate	it	against	the	back-
ground	of	the	speculative	discussion	about	Malthus.	In	this	chapter,	Nietzsche	
uses the concept of Sinnverschiebung (shift of sense,	“Sinn”	repeatedly	put	be-
tween	quotation	marks)	and	thus	avoids	the	Malthusian	semantics	of	Anpas-
sung,	except	when	he	discusses	it	as	the	reactive	adjustment of an organism 
to	perturbations	in	its	environment.	Relocating	the	notion	of	natural	selection	





mission and inheritance over the course of successive generations. Nietzsche 
makes	this	distinction	explicit:











very	convincing.	Nevertheless,	Moore	 is	 correct	 in	noticing	 that	Nietzsche	
goes beyond the contemporary understanding of exaptation and adaptation. 
Nietzsche	points	out	 that	what	we	call	exaptation	does	not	 just	refer	 to	 the	
evolutionary process in which the actual  use of a trait  does not  necessarily 
match	 the	historical	use	 for	which	 it	was	selected	by	natural	 selection,	but	

























ervation,	 as	 nature’s	 primary	 life	 force.25	As	was	 the	 case	with	 adaptation,	
Nietzsche	understands	self-preservation	as	a	second-order	phenomenon,	be-
cause  it  is  a  retraction  of  the  primary  tendency  to  manipulate  the  environ-
ment.26
Also	 sprach	 Zarathustra,	 De	Gruyter,	 Berlin	
1997,	pp.	239–240.
20	   
G.	Moore,	Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor,	
pp.	 21–23;	 M.	 Clark,	 “Nietzsche	 Was	 No	
Lamarckian”;	 R.	 Schacht,	 “Nietzsche	 and	
Lamarckism”.
21   
Stephen	J.	Gould,	Elisabeth	S.	Vrba,	“Exapta-
tion	–	a	missing	term	in	the	science	of	form“,	
Paleobiology	 8	 (1982)	 1,	 pp.	 4–15,	 doi:	
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0094837300004310.




paradoxical  conclusion  that  contemporary  
evolutionary	 biology	 is	 ‘Anti-Darwin’	 itself.	
Yet,	Dennett	correctly	observes:	“Aside	from	
Nietzsche’s	 characteristic	 huffing	 and	 puff-
ing about  some power subduing and becom-
ing	master,	this	is	pure	Darwin.	Or,	as	Gould	
might	put	it,	all	adaptations	are	exaptations,	in	
cultural evolution as well as in biological evo-
lution.”	–	Daniel	Clement	Dennett,	Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning 
of Life,	Penguin,	London	1995,	p.	465.
23   
G.	Moore,	“Nietzsche	and	Evolutionary	The-
ory”,	p.	520.
24   
Charles	Darwin,	The  origin  of  species,	 P.	 F.	
Collier,	New	York	1909,	p.	472.
25   
Nietzsche’s	 references	 to	 exploitation	 as	 the	
primary	function	of	everything	alive	is,	con-
trary  to  what  Ansell-Pearson  claims  (Viroid 
Life,	pp.	105–106),	not	an	expression	of	aris-
tocratic  radicalism  –	 a	 term	 introduced	 in	
1888	 by	 one	 of	 Nietzsche’s	 earliest	 critical	
commentators,	the	Danish	philosopher	Georg	
Brandes	–	but	a	different	way	of	saying	 that	
the  primary  drive  of  life  is  appropriation. 
“‹Exploitation›	does	not	belong	to	a	corrupted	
or	 imperfect,	primitive	 society:	 it	belongs	 to	
the  essence  of  being  alive  as  a  fundamental  
organic	function;	it	is	a	result	of	genuine	will	
to	power,	which	is	just	the	will	of	life.	–	Al-




26	   
In	 this	 sense,	 we	 agree	 with	 Abel	 (Günter	
Abel,	 “Nietzsche	 contra	 ‘Selbsterhaltung’;	
Steigerung	 der	 Macht	 und	 Ewige	 Wieder-
kehr”,	 Nietzsche Studien	 10	 (1982)	 1,	 pp.	
367–384,	 doi:	 https://doi.org/10.1515/978311	
0244304.367). Ahern  correctly  analyses  
Nietzsche’s	 critical	 assessment	 of	 self-pres-
ervation	as	follows:	“First,	its	impulse	is	not	
toward  future  growth  via  the  other  drives  
but  toward  an  immediate  stop  to  the  haem-
orrhage	of	 the	 body’s	 strength.	 In	 short,	 its	
perspective is limited to mere stability. Sec-
ond,	it	strives	for	stability	through	negating	
the	 most	 powerful	 drives.”	 –	 D.	 R.	 Ahern,	




“To	wish	 to	 preserve	 oneself	 is	 a	 sign	 of	 distress,	 of	 a	 limitation	 of	 the	 truly	 basic	 life-in-
stinct,	which	aims	at	the expansion of power	and	in	so	doing	often	enough	risks	and	sacrifices	
self-preservation. [...] the struggle for survival is only an exception,	a	temporary	restriction	of	
the	will	to	life;	the	great	and	small	struggle	revolves	everywhere	around	preponderance,	around	
growth	and	expansions,	around	power	and	in	accordance	with	the	will	to	power,	which	is	simply	
the will to life.” (GS	349)
Rolph’s	Biologische  Probleme27	 and	Darwin’s	Malthusian	 interpretation	 of	









teleological implications. Seeing it as primary life-drive presupposes that the 





powers  and  self-preservation  is  an  instinct  that  overpowers  other  instincts.  




tion. It is crucial to notice that this intellection allows Nietzsche to address an-
other	evolutionary	force.	The	evolution	of	a	human	being	or	human	‘races’	is	
not determined by anatomical evolution alone but also involves the intellect. 
Going back to our original reading of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I,	this	
explains,	as	aphorism	224	showed,	why	the	weaker	foster	progress:
“The	strongest	natures	preserve	the	type,	the	weaker	help	it	to	evolve.	[…]	A	people	that	be-
comes somewhere weak and fragile but is as a whole still strong and healthy is capable of ab-
sorbing the infection of the new and incorporating it to its own advantage.” (HH	I	224)
Nietzsche’s	line	of	thought	corresponds	to	the	views	of	heredity	that	had	been	
circulating	since	the	1820s,	in	particular	those	developed	by	von	Baer.29 In-
conspicuous	 as	 it	may	be	 at	 first	 sight,	 he	 expands	 the	modus	operandi	 of	

















natural  selection from the  point  of  view of  an  integrative  understanding of  
the human. In The Antichrist, written	in	the	fall	of	1888,	he	claims	that	“pity	
runs	counter	to	the	law	of	development,	which	is	the	law	of	selection” (A	7).31 
Compassion is irreconcilable with evolution because it rescinds variation and 
counteracts	selection.	Since	Nietzsche	identifies	the	“law	of	the	development”	
of	life	with	“the	law	of	selection”,	we	can	interpret	the	latter	as	the	ultimate	
reference to natural selection in a discursive setting in which the difference 
between the biological and cultural level is abandoned.
We can conclude that Nietzsche takes up his Anti-Darwin position because he 
reads Darwinism as a reactive theory.32	However,	this	position	is	not	gratui-
tous. Nietzsche opposes to and interacts with Darwinism in order to come to 
a better understanding of certain phenomena Darwinism claimed to have ex-
plained.	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	clings	to	its	intrinsic	evolutionary	paradigm,	
one	that	aims	at	surpassing	the	traditional	opposition	between	mind	and	body,	
by explicitly giving the intellect (Geist)	a	place,	while	“Darwin	forgot	about	
spirit” (TI	“Skirmishes”	14).	This	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	the	intellect	
for evolution most clearly shows why Nietzsche considers himself to be An-
ti-Darwin in his later writings.
The Intellect
The  interaction  between  humans  and  the  environment  and  their  impact  on  
their	own	physical	constitution	encompasses	both	body	and	intellect,	insofar	
as the intellect is orientated towards the world through the body. Nietzsche as-
sociates the intellect (Geist)	with	“caution,	patience,	cunning,	disguise,	great	




27   
Cf.	G.	Moore,	Nietzsche, Biology and Meta-
phor,	p.	37.
28   
Hans	Jonas,	The Phenomenon of Life: Toward 
a  Philosophical  Biology,	 Northwestern	Uni-
versity	Press,	Evanston	(IL)	2001.
29   
Ohad	Parnes,	 “‘Es	 ist	 nicht	 das	 Individuum,	





der	 (eds.),	 Generation: zur Genealogie des 
Konzepts – Konzepte von Genealogie,	 Fink,	
München	 –	 Paderborn	 2005,	 pp.	 235–259,	
here p. 235.
30	   
In Jenseits  von Gut  und Böse,	Nietzsche	ex-
plains	what	he	conceives	of	as	“herds	of	peo-
ple”:	 “…	racial	groups,	 communities,	 tribes,	
folk,	states,	churches.”	(BGE	199)




of  the  principle  of  selection  in  a  social-Dar-
winist	context	means	that	he	rejects	the	prin-




with	 regard	 to	natural	 selection.	Cf.	Dirk	R.	
Johnson,	 “Gattung”,	 in:	 Paul	 van	 Tonger-
en,	 Gerd	 Schank,	 Herman	 Siemens	 (eds.),	
Nietzsche-Wörterbuch,	 De	 Gruyter,	 Berlin	
2011.
32   
Cf.	 Call’s	 remark:	 “Nietzsche	 attacked	 Dar-
win	and	‘Darwinism’	because	he	believed	that	
these theories were manifestations of scientif-
ic	nihilism.”	–	Lewis	Call,	“Anti-Darwin,	An-
ti-Spencer:	 Friedrich	 Nietzsche’s	 critique	 of	






vocabulary associated with weakness and physical restriction. Those who are 
bodily inapt to realise their goals will use their intellect (Geist)	to	do	so:
“You	have	to	need	spirit	in	order	to	get	it,	–	you	lose	it	when	you	lose	the	need	for	it.	Anyone	
with strength can do without spirit.”
It  seems that  the intellect  enables  humans to  compensate  for  their  physical  
weaknesses;	the	weaker	someone	is,	the	more	compelling	the	use	of	the	in-




“[C]omparatively	 speaking,	 humans	 are	 the	 biggest	 failures,	 the	 sickliest	 animals	who	 have	
strayed	the	most	dangerously	far	from	their	instincts	–	but	of	course	and	in	spite	of	everything,	
the most interesting	animals	as	well!	[…]	[W]e	see	the	development	of	consciousness,	‘spirit’,	
as  a  symptom of  precisely  the  relative  imperfection	of	 the	organism,	as	an	experimenting,	a	
groping,	a	mistaking,	as	an	exertion	that	is	sapping	an	unnecessarily	large	amount	of	strength	
away	from	the	nervous	system,	–	we	deny	that	anything	can	be	made	perfect	as	long	as	it	is	still	
being made conscious.” (A	14)
In Götzen-Dämmerung, Nietzsche  attributes  a  greater  degree  of  cleverness  
and cunning (List)	 to	 the	common.	The	mediocre	gain	dominance	over	 the	
exceptional	by	 their	greater	numbers,33  but  also  because  they  are  more  de-
pendent on the use of the intellect that allows them to dominate.
“[T]he	weak	keep	gaining	dominance	over	the	strong,	–	there	are	more	of	them,	and	besides,	
they are cleverer	[…].”	(TI “Skirmishes”	14)
As	Nietzsche	mentions	in	aphorism	116	of	Die fröhliche Wissenschaft called 
“Herd	Instinct”,	mediocre	people	are	more	cunning than the exceptional be-
cause	 they	 coerce	 the	best-adapted	humans	by	means	of	morality	 to	 “be	 a	
function of the herd and to ascribe value to [themselves] only as a function” 
(GS	 116).	The	weak	 are	more	 clever,	Nietzsche	 claims,	 because	 education	
instrumentalises	those	who	are	educated	in	favour	of	the	benefits	of	the	herd	
and forces them to abandon their individuality.34	In	aphorism	268	of	Jenseits 
von Gut und Böse, Nietzsche relates the unfavourable position of the excep-










the adaptation of organisms undergo a vital change in the eleven-year period 
between Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I and Götzen-Dämmerung.36 In the 
initial	opposition,	 the	powerful	are	strong	and	 in	 the	majority,	 the	“tender-








Der Antichrist,	where	Nietzsche	distinguishes	three	types of humans. Some 
humans	are	more	intellectually	inclined,	while	others	are	more	prone	to	ad-
dress	their	physical	powers.	The	third	type	is	the	mediocre,	who	is	ubiquitous:
“In	 every	 healthy	 society,	 three	mutually	 conditioning	 physiological	 types	 separate	 out	 and	
gravitate	 in	 different	 directions,	 each	one	having	 its	 own	hygiene,	 its	 own	area	of	work,	 its	
own	feelings	of	perfection	and	field	of	mastery.	Nature,	not	Manu,	separates	out	predominantly	
spiritual people from people characterised by muscular and temperamental strength from a third 
group	of	people	who	are	not	distinguished	in	either	way,	the	mediocre,	–	the	latter	being	the	
great	number,	the	first	being	the	exceptions.”	(A	57)
That	 the	mediocre,	 the	 herd,	 is	 superior	 in	 numbers	 to	 the	 exceptional,	 is	
congruent  with  the  pyramidal  concept  of  society  Nietzsche  unfolds  in  Der 
Antichrist.	His	aristocratism	cannot	be	seen	as	a	simple	political	preference;	












33   
See also aphorism 51 of Der Antichrist, where 
Nietzsche  claims that  the  success  of  Christi-
anity is not due to the increasing corruption of 
Roman	nobility,	but	to	the	fact	that	Christians	
managed to outnumber the aristocrats.
34   
“That	 is	 how	 education	 always	 proceeds:	 it	
tries to condition the individual through var-
ious  attractions  and  advantages  to  adopt  a  
way	 of	 thinking	 and	 behaving	 that,	 when	 it	
becomes	a	habit,	drive	and	passion,	will	rule	
in him and over him against his ultimate ad-
vantage	but	for	the	‘common	good’.”	(GS	21)
35   
“People	 who	 are	 more	 alike	 and	 ordinary	
have	always	been	at	an	advantage;	while	peo-
ple	who	 are	more	 exceptional,	 refined,	 rare,	
and	difficult	 to	understand	will	easily	remain	
alone,	 prone	 to	 accidents	 in	 their	 isolation	
and rarely propagating.” (BGE	268)	See	also	
aphorism 117  of  Die  fröhliche  Wissenschaft, 
entitled	“Herd	pangs	of	conscience”.
36	   
This	 shift,	 overlooked	 by	 Richardson	
(“Nietzsche	 contra	 Darwin”,	 p.	 570),	 im-
plies  that  Nietzsche  distances  himself  more  
and  more  from  the  von  Baer  point  of  view.  
Moore  indicates  that  Nietzsche is  in  this  pe-
riod	 strongly	 engaged	 in	 reading	 Rolph	 (G.	
Moore,	Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor,	p.	 
 
128).	The	change	 in	his	 thinking	may	hence	
be	due	 to	 his	Rolph	 reading,	 but	 also	 to	 the	
influence	 of	 Féré,	 whose	 work	 Sensation 
et  mouvement  he  had  read  in  the  Spring  of  
1888	 (cf.	Hans	Erich	Lampl,	 “Ex	oblivione.	
Das	 Féré-Palimpsest”,	 Nietzsche-Studien 
15	 (1986),	 pp.	 225–264,	 doi:	 https://doi.
org/10.1515/9783110244342.225;	 Bettina	
Wahrig-Schmidt,	 “‘Irgendwie,	 jedenfalls	
physiologisch.’	 Friedrich	 Nietzsche,	 Alex-
ander	Herzen	 (fils)	 und	Charles	Féré	 1888”,	
Nietzsche-Studien	 17	 (1988),	 pp.	 434–464).	
This	 hypothesis,	 of	 course,	 requires	 further	
investigation.
37   
This  can  be  deduced  from  one  of  the  un-
published	 fragments	 (KSA	 13:14[123],	 pp.	
303–305),	written	in	the	spring	of	1888.	Here,	
Nietzsche  asserts  that  natural  selection  does  
not	 choose	 the	 strong	 and	 more	 complex	 –	
and  therefore  more  unstable –	 humans,	 but	
the	weak,	mediocre	types	who	are	more	stable	
and	durable:	“In	sum:	the	growth	of	the	power 
of a species is perhaps guaranteed less by the 
prepondering	 of	 its	 favourites,	 its	 strongest	
members,	 than	 by	 the	 preponderance	 of	 the	
average	and	lower	types	[…].	In	the	latter	is	
the	great	 fruitfulness,	duration;	with	 the	 for-
mer	comes	growing	danger,	rapid	devastation,	









he	paradoxically	pleads	for	 the	protection	of	 the	strong	against	 the	weak	–	
because	it	keeps	gaining	dominance	over	the	strong,	which	is	in	his	view	a	




iation  of  ideas  in  order  to  reinforce  cultural  levelling.38  But  how does  this  
happen?
The Sociological Power of Cultural Evolution
As	we	 indicated,	Nietzsche	 claims	 already	 in	Menschliches, Alzumenschli-
ches I that both rekindling and stabilising forces allow for an accumulation 
of	 knowledge	 and,	 consequently,	 for	 society’s	 development.	Accumulation	
allows	cultural	adaptations	to	evolve	from	small	variations,	during	a	person’s	
life,	i.e.	that	person’s	Bildung,	and	over	successive	generations.	In	aphorism	
361	of	Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Nietzsche states that transgenerational sed-














in	 less	 travelled	mountain	valleys,	 in	more	 self-enclosed	communities	 […].”	 (AOM	 223;	 cf.	
also GS 9)
Cultural	evolution	functions	through	what	we	today	would	call	socialisation:	
the incorporation of societal norms by the individual.  Nietzsche places this 
process	within	 the	 encompassing	view	of	 cultural	 evolution	because,	 from	
this	 perspective,	 communities	 themselves	 can	 be	 conceived	 of	 as	 units	 of	
selection.	Hence,	 the	necessity	of	 a	 community	 to	maximise	 the	 similarity	
between  its  constituents  is  to  advance  its  own  subsistence  and  prevent  its  
disintegration. That cultural evolution operates through socialisation and ac-
cumulation becomes apparent in the issue of race.
In aphorism 44 of The Antichrist, Nietzsche	explains	that	the	“logical	cyni-
















formed from social learning (Tradition)	into	an	instinct	and	thus	become	part	
of	the	human	body:	“that	is	not	only	tradition,	it	is	endowment	[Erbschaft]:	
only as endowment would it act like nature” (A	44).	The	explicit	use	of	Erb-
schaft	–	which	literally	means	inheritance,	but	usually	is	translated	as	endow-
ment	(as	does	Norman)	–	as	opposed	to	tradition,	emphasises	the	prerequisite	
of an accumulated process over generations.40 Socialisation and accumulation 
make	attitudes,	skills,	beliefs,	etc.	into	something	corporeal,	eventually	form-
ing	a	characteristic	of	a	certain	group	of	people	(and	as	such	a	‘race’):	“Hierzu	
gehört	R a s s e .”	A	race	is	for	Nietzsche	a	group	of	people	who	have	come	to	
share	“inner	experiences”	(BGE	268)	and	have	accumulated	common	prefer-
ences over a long period of time.
“It	 is	utterly	 impossible	 that	a	person	might	 fail  to  have the qualities  and propensities  of  his  
elders	and	ancestors	in	his	body:	however	much	appearances	might	speak	against	it.	This	is	the	
problem of race.” (BGE 264;	cf.	also	BGE 268)
As	Schank	already	noticed,	“race”	and	“people”	are	therefore	not	reductive	bi-
ological	notions,	but	concepts	in	which	cultural	and	biological	forces	merge.41 
38   
Cf. WS	267.
39   
See also aphorism 47 of Götzen-Dämmerung,	
where  he  explains  expressions  of  beauty  in  
a	 race	or	 a	 family	 as	 “the	final	 result	 of	 the	
accumulated labour of generations”. Graceful 
gestures	 are	 no	 individual	 accomplishments,	
but require the accumulated incorporation of 
every  stylisation  of  behaviour  into  the  body.  
Good	things	are	inherited;	only	by	the	process	
of Einverleibung they  can  be  transformed  
from  conscious  manipulations  of  behaviour  
into spontaneous motions.
40	   
We  agree  that  much  can  be  said  in  favour  
of	 Norman’s	 translation	 of	 Erbschaft  as  a  
cross-generational  transfer  of  capital  or  of  a  
gift. The context in which Nietzsche uses this 
term,	 however,	 clearly	 refers	 to	 cultural	 pro-
cesses	in	terms	of	race,	instincts	and	active	ac-
cumulation	 across	 generations;	 hence,	 inher-
itance seems a more adequate translation to us.
41   
“Das	Wort	‘Rasse’	hat	demnach	bei	Nietzsche,	
in	den	bisher	interpretierten	Texten,	überwieg-
end	 die	 Bedeutung	 ‘Volk’,	 was	 auch	 daraus	
hervorgeht,	 dass	 Nietzsche	 oft	 die	 Wörter	
‘Rasse’	 und	 ‘Volk’	 im	 gleichen	 Text	 nebe-
neinander	 verwendet.	 ‘Volk’	 wird	 dabei	 als	
kulturell	 gewordene	 Einheit	 verstanden,	 die	
aber auch noch teilweise fehlen kann (so bei 
den	 Deutschen).	 Vorbilder	 sind	 die	 Griech-
en,	 Juden	 und	 Franzosen,	 die	 ihre	 Einheit	
(Griechen	 ‘Schönheit,	 auch	 bei	 den	 Juden)	
‘erarbeitet’	haben.	Die	Vorstellung	einer	‘rei-
nen’	genealogischen	oder	biologischen	Basis	
im  Sinn  einer  unvermischten  Abstammung  




‘Synthese’,	 ‘rein’	 werden.”	 –	 Gerd	 Schank,	
“Rasse” und “Züchtung” bei Nietzsche,	 De	
Gruyter,	 Berlin	 2000,	 p.	 148.	On	 this	 point,	





A	Case-Study:	Beyond Good and Evil, § 262
This  threat  to  cultural  development  is  addressed  as  the  case-study  in  para-
graph	262	of	Jenseits von Gut und Böse,	where	Nietzsche	discusses	the	ques-
tion	of	breeding	an	aristocratic	community.	He	draws	the	readers’	attention	
to a cultural evolutionary process parallel to what is now known as adaptive 
radiation,	claiming	that	the	emergences	of	cultures	depend	on	the	successful	
survival of groups in adverse ecological niches. Curtailing cultural variation 
among	 group	members	 stabilises	 the	 group	 and	 thus	 engenders	 a	 “sturdy”	
type	of	human.	Referring	to	a	cultural	group	or	community	as	a	“species”,	
Nietzsche reiterates the incorporation of cultural change into a model of bio-
logical	evolution:





community (such as Venice or an ancient Greek polis)	as	an	organisation	that	has	been	estab-
lished,	whether	voluntarily	or	 involuntarily,	 for	 the	sake	of	breeding:	 the	people	 living	 there	




and make itself persevere in constant struggle with its neighbors or with the oppressed who are 
or threaten to become rebellious.” (BGE	262)
Reducing	 variation	 to	 one	 specific,	 successful	 type	 promotes	 qualities	 that	
will be advanced to the later generations as virtues. This accumulative breed-
ing42	 of	 younger	 generations	 –	 “voluntarily	 or	 involuntarily”	 –	 gradually	
adapts	individuals	or	groups	to	their	environment.	Educating	a	“sturdy”	type	
hence	is	no	longer	experienced	as	necessary	for	survival,	but	it	becomes	“a	




“Variation,	whether	 as	 deviation	 (into	 something	higher,	 finer,	 rarer)	 or	 as	 degeneration	 and	
monstrosity,	suddenly	comes	onto	the	scene	in	the	greatest	abundance	and	splendor;	the	individ-
ual	dares	to	be	individual	and	different.	At	these	turning	points	of	history,	a	magnificent,	diverse,	




or refuge from morality as it has existed so far. It was this very morality that accumulated the 
tremendous	amount	of	force	to	put	such	a	threatening	tension	into	the	bow:	–	and	now	it	is,	now	
it	is	being	‘outlived’.”	(BGE	262)
The old morality provided an appropriate answer to unfavourable conditions 
in	 the	past;	“being	outlived”,	 it	 failed	 to	provide	successful	answers	 to	 the	















This	 genius	 of	 the	 race,	which	 expresses	 itself	 as	 an	 abundant	 eruption	of	
creativity,	 threatens	 –	 and	 therefore	 rejuvenates	 –	 community	 stability.	To	
control	 this	 threat,	 a	 conservative	 reflex	 sees	 to	 it	 that	 not	 the	 exceptional	
individuals,	 steering	 the	 future	 development	 of	 the	 community,	 thrive	 and	
multiply	in	these	chaotic	times,	but	rather	the	“mediocre”:









nicate (see also GS	354),	stabilising	the	community’s	cultural	landscape	and	







who	are	more	exceptional,	 refined,	 rare,	and	difficult	 to	understand	will	easily	remain	alone,	
prone to accidents in their isolation and rarely propagating. Immense countervailing forces will 
have	to	be	called	upon	in	order	to	cross	this	natural,	all-too-natural	progressus in simile,	people	
becoming	increasingly	similar,	ordinary,	average,	herd-like,	–	increasingly	base!”	(BGE	268)
This intrinsic tendency of cultural evolution to make the members of a cul-
tural	group	more	similar,	base	and	herd-like	finds	 its	expression	in	the	dem-
ocratic	 tendencies	 of	 nineteenth-century	 European	 states.	When	Nietzsche	
calls	“the	democratic	movement	[…]	the	heir	to	Christianity”	(BGE	202)	it	is	






to reach with our hopes?” (BGE	203)
42   
See  also  paragraph  188  of  Jenseits  von  Gut  
und Böse,	which	explains	morality	as	a	form	
of	 long-term	 compulsion.	 See	 also	 Schank’s	
claim	 that	“Nietzsche	uses	Darwinian	 terms,	
such	 as	 ‘selection’,	 […]	 with	 a	 new	 meta-
phorical	 meaning”:	 “the	 word	 ‘Züchtung’	
in	Nietzsche’s	 usage	means	 ‘education’,	 not	
biological	 breeding”.	 –	Gerd	 Schank,	 “Race	
and	Breeding	in	Nietzsche’s	Philosophy”,	in:	 
 
Nicholas	Martin	(ed.),	Nietzsche and the Ger-
man  Tradition,	Lang,	Frankfurt	on	 the	Main	
2003,	 pp.	 237–244,	 here	 p.	 243.	 Schank’s	
explanation	 confirms	 our	 hypothesis	 that	
















enough to give impetus to opposed valuations and initiate a revaluation and reversal of ‘eternal 
values’;	 towards	 those	 sent	out	 ahead;	 towards	 the	men	of	 the	 future	who	 in	 the	present	 tie	
the knots and gather the force that compels the will of millennia into new channels. To teach 
humanity	its	future	as	its	will,	as	dependent	on	a	human	will,	to	prepare	for	the	great	risk	and	







Nietzsche’s	enigmatic	concept	of	eternal	 recurrence	 (ewige  Wiederkunft)	 is	
not often the centre of attention when his Anti-Darwinian perspective is being 
discussed.	Then	again,	understanding	the	role	of	culture	and	intellect	in	evo-
lution helps us to appreciate the magnitude Nietzsche ascribed to the idea of 
eternal recurrence. It appears most clearly in the famous aphorism 341 of Die 




would	 lie	on	your	actions	as	 the	heaviest	weight!	Or	how	well	disposed	would	you	have	 to	




iest of all questions. The prophetical allure of the question indicates that the 
issue	of	eternal	recurrence	may	well	be	one	of	the	“immense	countervailing	
measures” (BGE	268)	with	which	Nietzsche	hopes	to	counteract	the	process	
of making human beings more base. Central to this issue is the possibility of 
incorporating	the	idea:	those	who	consider	it,	have	to	be	“well	disposed”	to	
bear	its	weight,	and	when	they	do	so,	the	idea	will	“transform”	them.	Hence,	
it	 selects	 those	who	are	healthy	and	 strong	enough	–	exceptional	people	–	





















ment  Nietzsche  claims  that  those  who  do  not  believe  in  eternal  recurrence  
will	 eventually	 become	 extinct	 (KSA	 9:11[338],	 p.	 573).44  Ansell-Pearson  
assumes	that	this	principle	of	selection,	which	operates	on	the	cultural	level,	
replaces	natural	selection:
“If	man	is	 the	product	of	natural	selection,	 the	overman	–	considered	as	 the	 future  of  evolu-
tion	–	will	be	the	invention	of	a	wholly	different	kind,	and	it	is	in	the	context	of	Nietzsche’s	
engagement with Darwin that we can perhaps best understand his positing of the eternal return 
as promoting an alternative principle of selection to be placed in the service ‘of strength (and 
barbarism!!)’.”45
Now	we	can	understand	why	this	is	not	the	case	–	on	the	contrary.	The	princi-





“…	 memetische	 Züge	 kultureller	 Entwicklung	 […und]	 gehört	 […]	 auch	 der	 natürlichen	
Entwicklung	 an	 […].	 Sie	 liefert	 nicht	 nur	 eine	Alternative	 zur	 Evolution,	 die	 sie	 zugleich	
einschließt,	sondern	auch	zu	deren	Gesetz	der	Selektion,	sofern	sie	nicht	mehr	selektierend	die	
Wiederkunft aller Dinge will.”46
However,	Skowron	draws	the	wrong	conclusion:	eternal	recurrence	is	not	An-
ti-Darwinian,	he	claims,	because	it	gives	up	the	practice	of	selection	in	order	









44   
Earlier	 in	 the	 same	 notebook,	 Nietzsche	 re-
flects	 on	the	“slow	process	of	selection”	and	
the ways in which the individual can surpass 
this	 (KSA	9:11[43],	p.	457).	This	underlines	
the  importance  of  the  evolutionary  context  
in  which  the  concept  of  eternal  recurrence  
functions  and  is  overlooked  entirely  by  e.g.  
Deleuze:	“…	the	extreme	forms	return	–	those	
which,	large	or	small,	are	deployed	within	the	
limit	 and	 extend	 to	 the	 limit	 of	 their	 power,	 
 
transforming  themselves  and  changing  one  
into	another.	Only	the	extreme,	the	excessive,	
returns;	that	which	passes	into	something	else	
and	 becomes	 identical.”	 –	 Gilles	 Deleuze,	
Difference and Repetition,	trans.	Paul	Patton,	
Athlone,	London	–	New	York	2004,	p.	51.
45   
K.	Ansell-Pearson,	Viroid Life,	p.	101.
46	   
M.	 Skowron,	 “Nietzsches	 ‘Anti-Darwinis-
mus’”,	p.	192.










the  body as  an  instinct.49  The  goal  of  the  idea  of  eternal  return  is  to  trans-






in	 the	common	sense	of	 the	word,	but	 in	 its	 enriched	meaning,	 surpassing	
the  traditional  mind-body-dichotomy.  In  his  philosophical  investigations  
on	evolution,	Nietzsche	understands	human	beings	as	organisms	capable	of	
culture,	who	have	a	 recursive	 influence	 on	 their	own	physical	constitution.	
The intellect makes humans more responsive to environmental perturbations 
and enhances their  survival rate.  The laede-neminem-morals	–	in	particular	
European	Christianity	–	are	determined	by	Nietzsche	as	the	cultural	forma-
tions most responsible for the increasing imbalance between physiology and 
culture throughout history.51 They one-sidedly advocate the development of 
the	intellect	over	the	body	–	a	process	Nietzsche	tries	to	counteract	with	his	
philosophy of eternal recurrence. The re-evaluation of values brought about 
by  eternal  recurrence  has  to  restore  the  evolutionary  dynamic  of  body  and  




rather he was trying to tackle the questions it left unanswered.





Ovaj se rad bavi aktualnom raspravom o Nietzscheovoj vezi s darvinizmom, usmjeren na 
posebno značenje Nietzscheova integrativnog razmatranja evolucije u njegovim spisima. 
Istražujući rječnik evolucije u njegovim raspravama o volji za moć i kriticizmu Malthusova 
pojma prilagodbe, radom se tvrdi da je takozvana anti-darvinistička pozicija u Nietzscheovim 
kasnim spisima dio njegova obuhvatnog pokušaja da nadiđe uske granice strogo anatomsko-
biološkog ili društveno-darvinističkog pojma evolucije. Da Nietzsche to čini služeći se 
biologijskim rječnikom pokazuje njegova revnost u kartiranju utjecaja bioloških i kulturnih 
sila na ljudsku evoluciju. Radom se aktualna rasprava o kulturi i evoluciji želi smjestiti u 
širu povijesnu perspektivu. Istovremeno, želi doprinijeti i boljem razumijevanju Nietzscheove 
filozofijske antropologije, a posebno, njegove mijenjajuće ideje o slabosti i snazi, o intelektu i 
vječnom vraćanju istoga kao principu selekcije – ideje koje je Nietzsche razvio u nastojanju da 
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Natürliche	Selektion,	Ausgleichung	und	




Diese Arbeit setzt sich mit der gegenwärtigen Diskussion über Nietzsches Verbindung zum 
Darwinismus auseinander und konzentriert sich auf die besondere Bedeutung von Nietzsches 
integrativer  Betrachtung  der  Evolution  in  seinen  Schriften.  Indem  man  den  Wortbestand  
zur Evolution in seinen Erörterungen über den Willen zur Macht und den Kritizismus im 
Hinblick auf Malthus‘ Anpassungsbegriff erforscht, argumentiert man mit diesem Aufsatz, 
dass die sogenannte antidarwinistische Position in Nietzsches späteren Schriften Teil seines 
eingehenden Bemühens ist, den engen Rahmen eines streng anatomisch-biologischen oder 
sozialdarwinistischen Begriffs der Evolution zu sprengen. Dass Nietzsche dies mithilfe der 
biologischen Lexik tut, offenbart seinen Eifer, den Einfluss biologischer und kultureller Kräfte 
auf die menschliche Evolution zu kartieren. Der Beitrag versucht, die aktuelle Debatte über 
Kultur und Evolution in eine breitere historische Perspektive hineinzuversetzen. Gleichlaufend 
möchte man zu einer besseren Auslegung von Nietzsches philosophischer Anthropologie und 
insbesondere von seiner sich verändernden Vorstellung von Schwäche und Stärke, vom Intellekt 
und einer ewigen Wiederkunft des Gleichen als Prinzip der Selektion beisteuern – Ideen, die 
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La sélection naturelle, l’alignement et l’éternelle retour du même
Comment	Nietzsche	touche	au	darwinisme	dans	ses
efforts pour dépasser la dichotomie entre l’esprit et le corps
Résumé
Ce travail traite de la discussion actuelle sur la relation de Nietzsche avec le darwinisme, 
en se concentrant sur les considérations intégratives nietzschéennes de l’évolution dans 
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Also	 see:	 “Wenn	 du	 dir	 den	 Gedanken	 der	
Gedanken	 einverleibst,	 so	 wird	 er	 dich	 ver-
wandeln.	 Die	 Frage	 bei	 allem,	 was	 du	 thun	
willst:	 ‹ist	 es	 so,	 daß	 ich	 es	 unzählige	Male	
thun	 will?›	 ist	 das	 größte  Schwergewicht.”  
(KSA	9:11[143],	p.	496)
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Biebuyck,	 “The	mechanism	 of	 cultural	 evo-
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ses  écrits.  Recherchant  le  vocabulaire  de  l’évolution  dans  ses  discussions  sur  la  volonté  de  
puissance et dans la critique du concept malthusien de l’adaptation, ce travail affirme que ladite 
position anti-darwiniste dans les écrits tardifs nietzschéens constitue un élément de sa tentative 
d’ensemble  de  dépasser  les  limites  du  concept  d’évolution  strictement  biologico-anatomique  
ou du darwinisme social. Que Nietzsche s’y applique en se servant du vocabulaire biologique 
montre son zèle pour représenter l’influence des forces biologiques et culturelles sur l’évolution 
humaine. À travers ce travail, la discussion actuelle sur la culture et l’évolution est située dans 
une  perspective  historique  plus  large.  En  même  temps,  ce  travail  souhaite  aussi  contribuer  
à une compréhension plus exhaustive de la philosophie anthropologique de Nietzsche, et 
particulièrement, de ses idées changeantes sur la faiblesse et la force, sur l’intellect et l’éternel 
retour du même comme principes de sélection – idées que Nietzsche a développées dans ses 
efforts pour dépasser la séparation traditionnelle du corps et de l’esprit.
Mots-clés
évolution,	Charles	Darwin,	Friedrich	Wilhelm	Nietzsche,	éternel	retour	du	même,	volonté	de	
puissance,	corps,	adaptation,	esprit,	choix
